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Abstract. This article describes some unintended but predictable consequences of truth commissions 
impeding the consolidation of democracy in post-totalitarian and post-authoritarian states. 
 
The pursuit of justice may be a fool's errand. Or so some political analysts might conclude about the 
development and implementation of truth commissions in the service of consolidating democracy in 
post-totalitarian and post-authoritarian political regimes. 
 
Most often, significant controversy revolves around the Issue of justice as revealed truth versus justice 
as just deserts--e.g., retribution, punishment, and/or rehabilitation. The former is championed by many 
who view the latter as largely continuing to fuel a never-ending, vicious cycle of aggression. They also 
see to believe that only the truth can set a nation free from this cycle and set a course for democracy. 
Those seeking justice as retribution, punishment, and/or rehabilitation champion a consequence of 
injustice that is noxious in that even rehabilitation--as recommended by its champions--often involves 
techniques that are perceived by their target in an operant context of omission training or punishment. 
These champions seem to believe that the truth--far from setting a nation free and a democratic course-
-frees victimizers from a deserved and grim fate. 
 
A controversy that is less frequently mentioned concerns the very problem of identifying the truth and 
how this problem can be exploited by the enemies of representative democracy. Stories of events can 
be confabulated or distorted. Documents and other tangible data seemingly supporting various stories 
can be created or modified accordingly. Innuendo stemming from stories and tangible data will surely 
arise with the result being a psychopolitical burden added to the fragile strivings of democracy. 
 
A case in point is contemporary Poland. Truth procedures in this country require a political appraisal and 
vetting of political candidates--a process called lustration. Candidates can have collaborated with prior 
Communist regimes and still run for and hold political office as long as they admit to what they have 
done. However, they are banned from political office for 10 years if they are found to have lied by 
denying collaboration. The actual process of lustration is away from the light, however, and involves the 
confidential evaluation of information from informants and secret service files. 
 
Recently, Aleksander Kwasniewski, the current Polish president, and Lech Walesa, a past president who 
is currently running for president, have been accused of collaboration with the secret police during 
Poland's communist era. Both have been legally cleared. But legal clearing is not psychological clearing. 
As Mr. Walesa has been quoted in The New York Times, "Now I see it (lustration and the process of legal 
clearing) has no point because the whole operation did not convince anyone." Or as to the psychology of 
morality, Piotr Naimski, an accuser of Mr. Walesa, has been quoted in The Times as stating, "The courts 
are not the best way to answer moral questions." 
 
We might venture that a transparent lustration--i.e., letting anyone interested observe all details of that 
process--might attenuate such problems. However, shedding more light on lustration also guarantees 
that every shred of misinformation and disinformation becomes public. Moreover, truisms on truth in 
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the political arena of life--that we can never know what really happened or (more likely) that we can 
never know for sure that we know what really happened even if we are sure about what we know--play 
right into the hands of democracy's subverters and those who, indeed, are lying about their pasts. 
Instead, we are left with competing narratives of fiction and mythology that intersect with only some of 
the many elements of Truth. Here it is public discourse and a nation's collective soul that is being 
punished and needs reform and rehabilitation. (See Bank, R. (1999). Mythic perspectives and 
perspectives on truth: Approaching Winnicott by way of comparisons between Kohut and Freud. 
Psychoanalytic Review, 86, 109-135; Erlanger, S. (August 21, 2000). Polish watchdog nips at Walesa's 
heels. The New York Times, p. A6; Hamber, B. (1998). The burdens of truth: An evaluation of the 
psychological support services and initiatives undertaken by the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission. American Imago, 55, 9-28; Hocutt, M. (1994). Some truths about truth. Behavior and 
Philosophy, 22, 1-5; Ibanze, T. (1991). Social psychology and the rhetoric of truth. Theory and 
Psychology, 1, 187-201; Sarbin, T.R. (1998). The social construction of truth. Journal of Theoretical and 
Philosophical Psychology, 18, 144-150; Some truth about truth commissions. (February 14, 1997). IBPP, 
1(12); Some truth about truth commissions II. (September 12, 1997). IBPP, 3(7); Steinhart, E. (1994). 
Analogical truth conditions for metaphors. Metaphor and Symbolic Activity, 9, 161-178.) (Keywords: 
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